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This paper analyses the events that start with financial distress and may eventually lead to the 
liquidation and/or abandonment of the assets of the firm. It develops a scheme describing the 
sequence of possible outcomes starting with financial distress based on the existing literature and 
taking into account the legal environment in terms of liability and priority rules and bankruptcy 
law. An analysis of the treatment of financial distress in the theoretical financial literature is also 
performed, showing that there is no consensus in the treatment of financial distress. The common 
case of assuming simultaneous default and bankruptcy is shown to lead to suboptimal bankruptcy. 
Other theoretical approaches are shown to address this problem in different ways such as 
separating default from bankruptcy or by including protective covenants. The case of separation 
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determined default is shown to represent a special case that implies the existence of financial and 
credit constraints.  
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1 Introduction
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) propose a valuation methodology for
corporate securities using option pricing theory (OPT). Limited liability and absolute
priority rules create option-like asymmetrical profiles for shares and bonds that allow
them to be valued as options.
Under this perspective a share is similar to a call option on the assets of the firm in
which the strike price is equal to the face value of debt. Under the same perspective,
creditors are the conceptual owners of the assets of the firm and have written a call
option allowing shareholders to regain full control of the firm once they repay the face
value of debt. This call option is not a conventional financial option since it is an
option on a real underlying asset, an operating firm. In simple terms, if equityholders
exercise the call option there is no default and they once again become the sole owners
of the assets of the firm, if the call option is not exercised the equityholders default
and debtholders become the owners of the firm (under the role of equityholders).
This represents the simplest application of OPT to corporate finance and, from this
simple case, different theoretical branches developed, such as: the valuation of risky
debt (e.g. Merton, 1974, Geske, 1977, Leland, 1994) the determination/ measurement
of credit risk (e.g. Merton, 1974 and Black and Cox, 1976) and the valuation of different
types of strategic options (e.g. McDonald and Siegel, 1986, Myers and Majd, 1990).
In reality, default and the ownership transfer of the firm are two events of a longer
process that starts with financial distress and does not simply culminate in a costless
transfer of ownership. This paper analyses the theoretical treatment given to these
different real options that are embedded in the process that starts with financial dis-
tress and ultimately terminates with the liquidation of the assets of the firm or with
abandonment. Apart from the already mentioned limited liability and absolute priority
rules, there are other equally important legal (bankruptcy law) and contractual aspects
(protective covenants) that affect the different stages that follow financial distress in
terms of: who decides (exercises the option), what is the criteria for deciding and what
are the possible outcomes.
Understanding the process that starts with financial distress is important to both
decision makers of firms and to policymakers. The different stages, the process of
decision-making and the costs at each stage leading to liquidation are often overlap-
ping in the existing financial literature. To decision makers of firms it is important to
accurately value risky debt, model credit risk, determine the optimal capital structure
and to properly manage a financial distress. To policymakers it is important to un-
derstand this process in order to improve bankruptcy procedures and the theoretical
literature analyzing this process should, whenever possible, produce policy suggestions
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to improve the efficiency of the bankruptcy process.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 analyses and defines the events
of financial distress, default, bankruptcy, liquidation and abandonment describing the
natural sequence of these events. Section 3 analyses how these events are modeled in
the financial literature highlighting the positive and negative aspects of each approach.
Finally section 4 concludes describing the main gaps and weaknesses of existing liter-
ature and pointing out avenues for further research.
2 The process from financial distress to abandon-
ment
Following the seminal works of Fischer Black, Robert Merton and Myron Scholes on
OPT Myers (1977) recognized that option pricing theory could be applied to real
assets and non-financial investments. To differentiate the options on real assets from
the options on financial assets, Myers coined the term real options. There are almost
as many types of real options analyzed as there are managerial decisions.
The option to defer investments (often called the option to invest) is probably the
most analyzed option and it exists whenever there is uncertainty regarding future earn-
ings, irreversible or partially irreversible investments and proprietorship rights on the
investment opportunity. McDonald and Siegel (1986) analyzed such option considering
irreversible investments and uncertainty regarding returns and the cost of investment,
Ingersoll and Ross (1992) considered irreversible investments and uncertainty regard-
ing the cost of financing. Majd and Pindyck (1987) extend the option to delay for
projects with sequential investment outlays (time to build option) showing that such
a project could be viewed as a compound option and each stage of investment is an
option on the next stage. A similar setting is also analyzed by Carr (1988) that em-
ployed sequential options to value several exchange opportunities considering them as
compound options.
Margrabe (1978) developed a valuation model for an option to exchange one asset
for another, showing that the value of this option depends, not only on the present value
of the assets, but also on the variance covariance matrix for the rates of return on the
assets under exchange. The analysis of multiple and possibly interacting options was
also considered in Trigeorgis (1993). This paper analyses multiple interacting options
and shows that the value of a firm with multiple real options differs from the sum of
each of the real options valued individually, therefore highlighting the importance of
the interactions between the different options.
If the option to defer investments is the most analyzed, the option to abandon is
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possibly the most common real option. Most firms are exposed to the possibility of
abandoning operations or liquidating the assets of the firm. The only exceptions would
be firms which do not have any fixed costs (either operating or financing) and in which
the liquidation value of its assets is zero. Myers and Majd (1990) analyze the generally
defined option to abandon considering two competing technologies: technology A has a
positive salvage value and high operating costs, technology B has no salvage value but
low operating costs. In the case of technology A there is an option to liquidate whenever
the salvage value is higher than the continuation value, in the case of technology B, in
which there is no salvage value, there is an option to abandon a loss making business.
Both of these options are important to consider whenever firms experience financial
distress, but they are not the only options present, as we discuss next.
2.1 From financial distress to abandonment
The concepts of financial distress, default, bankruptcy and liquidation, found in the
financial literature, are often overlapping. Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006) defines
financial distress as the failure to meet payments to creditors or when the payment
is honored with difficulty. This concept overlaps with default as defined in Meck-
ling (1977), in which default is defined as a failure to make required debt payments
on a timely basis or to comply with other conditions of an obligation or agreement.
Bankruptcy is defined in Haugen and Senbet (1988) as the mere transfer of ownership
from one securityholder to another, Brealey et al. (2006) defines it similarly as a legal
mechanism that allows creditors to take over when a decline in asset value triggers
default. Liquidation is defined as the process of terminating a business including the
sale of assets and the use of the proceeds to discharge liabilities (Pratt, Reilly and
Schweis, 2000).
In this paper we follow the previous definitions, but consider a narrower concept
of financial distress than the one advocated in Brealey et al. (2006), financial distress
means that the firm is facing difficulties and it needs additional financing to meet
its obligations. This distinction is important to properly understand the different
outcomes of financial distress. Figure 1 represents the sequence of events following
financial distress, taking into account the possible different outcomes, which we analyze
and briefly discuss next.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
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2.1.1 Financial distress
Geske (1977) defines the equity of a firm with a coupon paying bond issued as a com-
pound option for which, in every coupon date, equityholders have to decide if they will
exercise a call option on the next coupon with an exercise price equal to the coupon
payment. The last call option is simply a call on the assets of the firm with an exercise
price equal to the face value of debt. The exercise of this sequence of call options is
automatic as long as the firm generates enough cash to pay the coupons. However,
during financial distress the situation is different due to the lack of funds and, for the
coupon payments to be honored, the firm has to obtain outside financing. The decision
to provide external financing and exercise the call option is in the hands of equityhold-
ers (as Myers and Majluf, 1984 argue, equity is the last resource financing source).
Following Myers and Majluf (1984), the need for external financing releases new infor-
mation to the market that investors, creditors and costumers will take into account.
This represents the source of the costs of distress such as decreased revenues/cash-flows
due to loss of costumers, loss of workers, loss of managerial focus, and tighter business
conditions (Baird, 1986 and Webb, 1987). Firms may recover from financial distress if
their revenues/cash-flows increase; however, it may be possible that a firm will even-
tually default on its obligations. This case means that equityholders have decided not
to exercise one of the call options associated with a financial obligation.
2.1.2 Default
Whenever the firm does not honor one of its obligations it is said to be in default.
Default can be represented in different ways using OPT. Following the same argument
as in the analysis of financial distress, default is the action of not exercising one of the
call options described in Geske (1977). It can also be represented as the exercise of a put
option on the shares of the firm with a strike price of zero. In either case, equityholders
default whenever the cash injection they have to make to avoid default is larger than
the present value of its shares. When equityholders decide not to honor one of their
obligations they simply default. Although there are no obvious direct costs associated
with the event of default, Harris and Ravid (1990) argue that debtholders may want
to incur investigation costs (e.g. audit expenses) following default to properly decide
on the action to take. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) argue that default generates
costs associated with future credit constraints. Brealey et al.(2006) discusses the cost
that debtholders charge for the option to default. Brealey et al. argue that corporate
bondholders expect to be compensated for awarding equityholders the option to default
and the premium on this option justifies why corporate bonds sell at lower prices and
offer higher yields than government bonds.
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2.1.3 Restructuring
Starting with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), which gave the firsts insight into how an
interest rate reduction can increase the value of a debt claim, the literature on debt
restructuring has expanded considerably. The rational is similar in all cases and debt
restructuring is seen an acceptable alternative, by both equityholders and debtholders,
to a costly liquidation and/or bankruptcy.
Using a binomial model and assuming liquidity constraints, Anderson and Sundare-
san (1996) show the possibilities shareholders have to force concessions from lenders,
through temporary reductions of coupon payments, under the threat of a costly liqui-
dation process and Anderson, Sundaresan and Tychon (1996) extend this framework
to continuous time and perpetual debt. Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) consider a
similar framework, but in which shareholders are able to make cash injections to avoid
default, and extend the analysis of Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) by considering,
not only the perspective of maximum bargaining power to shareholders, but also of
maximum bargaining power to lenders. Later work by Mella-Barral (1999) refines the
concepts of lenders concessions between ”deferring” and ”inducive” and between ”self-
imposed” and ”forced” concessions and considers the case in which the concessions are
not only reflected in reduced coupon payments but also in terms of collateral shar-
ing, providing a rational for existing deviations from absolute priority rules. All this
papers relied on financial constraints to explain the use of debt financing and mostly
ignored the role of interest tax shields. Later work by Hege and Mella-Barral (2000)
explicitly consider the role of interest tax shields and produce realistic estimates for an
endogenously determined optimal capital structure when concessions are permanent.
The analysis of multiple and uncoordinated creditors with different priority rules is ini-
tially performed in Hege and Mella-Barral (2005) and later extended in Bruche (2010)
through the analysis of coordination mechanisms between lenders.
2.1.4 Bankruptcy
Meckling (1977) argues that default and bankruptcy can be considered alternatives;
however, in most cases they are sequential events in which default precedes bankruptcy.
Brealey at al. (2006) defines bankruptcy as a legal mechanism that allows creditors to
take over when a decline in asset value triggers default and the bankruptcy costs are
the costs of using this mechanism. Following default, Brealey at al. (2006) argues that
debtors and creditors will try to renegotiate before bankruptcy is triggered. Myers
also indicates a distinction between distress and bankruptcy when arguing that the
value of the firm decreases during financial distress, but bankruptcy is not the cause
of this decline in value, it is merely its result. It is worth to notice that not only
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levered firms default and go bankrupt. However as Brealey at al. (2006) shows, higher
leverage increases the present value of the bankruptcy costs, by increasing the likelihood
of financial distress. Research on bankruptcy costs tends to divide them into two
categories (Webb, 1987, White, 1989 and Brealey at al., 2006):
- Direct costs: include legal costs, accountants fees and the value of managements
time spent administering the bankruptcy;
- Indirect costs: include the opportunity cost of creditors funds tied up during the
bankruptcy proceedings and the loss of interest tax shields.
The bankruptcy process differs from country to country and it can be started by
equityholders, or managers acting on behalf of equityholders, and debtholders alike.
Regardless of differences in national bankruptcy law, the bankruptcy process usually
always includes two alternatives (Hart, 1995 and Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan,
2007). In the first alternative the outcome of the bankruptcy process is the liquidation
of the assets of the firm (the US Chapter 7), in which the asset sale is processed
through a cash auction. In the second alternative the outcome of the bankruptcy
process is a reorganization of the firm (the US Chapter 11) in which the reorganization
is decided through structured bargaining between the different creditors. Usually when
the option to start the bankruptcy process is exercised by equityholders or managers
the aimed outcome is a reorganization of the firm, conversely, when the option to start
the bankruptcy process is exercised by debtholders the aimed outcome is a liquidation
of the firm, as evidenced by the large number of Chapter 7 debtholder fillings in the
US (White, 1989).
As Hart (1995) argues, the first alternative (liquidation usually through cash auc-
tions) has an attractive simplicity from a theoretical perspective. If capital markets
work well, the auction should generate an ex post efficient outcome. In particular, if
the firm is worth more as a going concern than liquidated, a bid to keep the firm to-
gether will dominate a set of independent bids for the assets. On the other hand, if the
firm is worth more closed down, a set of independent bids for the parts will dominate
a bid for the whole. The advantages of liquidation through an auction are highlighted
in Baird (1986) that shows how this method yields higher efficiency in the liquida-
tion of assets. Furthermore, as Hart (1995) argues, liquidation through a cash auction
presents additional advantages in the sense that it separates the decision to liquidate
from the decision of who gets what. There is no haggling among the claimants about
who should get what: the firm is transformed into a pile of cash, which is distributed
according to absolute priority (or some other agreed-in-advance rule).
Due to concerns with the effectiveness of cash auctions, a number of countries have
developed alternative procedures based on the notion of structured bargaining. The
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idea behind these procedures is that the firms claimants are encouraged to negotiate
the future of the firm (whether it should be liquidated or reorganized and how its value
should be divided up) according to predetermined rules (Hart, 1995).
The US Chapter 11 is a good example of the structured bargaining procedures and
its basic elements are as follows: (a) a stay is put on creditors claims, that is, they
are frozen and no creditor is allowed to seize or sell any of the firms assets during
the process, (b) claim holders are grouped into classes according to the type of claim
they have: secured or unsecured, senior or junior, (c) a judge supervises a process of
bargaining among class representatives to determine a plan of action and a division of
value for the firm. During the process, incumbent management usually runs the firm.
An important part of the procedure is that a plan can be implemented if it receives
approval by a suitable majority of each claimant class and unanimity is not required.
There is an ongoing discussion regarding the efficiency of bankruptcy law and Hart
(1995) summarizes some of its main criticisms, furthermore, he also defines a set of
goals for good bankruptcy law and makes some improvements proposals. Chapter 11
is argued to be time-consuming, costly, and too friendly to debtors for not respecting
absolute priority. However, Hart argues that there is a fundamental problem inherent
in Chapter 11, and in structured bargaining procedures like it, which are not solved
with simple adjustments. These problems arise, and justify the costs and time waste
of structured bargaining, because structured bargaining tries to make two decisions at
once: what to do with the firm, and who should get what in the event of a restructuring
of claims. Because a reorganized firm does not have an objective value it is hard to
divide the post-bankruptcy value between each group of creditors even if there is no
dispute about the amount and seniority of each creditors claim. Because the voting
mechanism is fixed in advance, a long negotiation process is expected without any
guarantee of achieving an optimal decision.
Hart (1995) questions the existence of the bankruptcy process, and justifies it ex-
istence with the inability of agents of being able to contractually define their own
bankruptcy rules. As so, and since bankruptcy law fills this market failure Hart de-
fines three goals a good bankruptcy law should achieve:
- Bankruptcy procedure should deliver an ex post efficient outcome, something not
guaranteed with pro-creditor or pro-debtor existing bankruptcy laws;
- Bankruptcy procedure should preserve the bonding role of debt by penalizing
managers and shareholders adequately in bankruptcy states;
- Bankruptcy procedure should preserve the absolute priority of claims, except
that some portion of value should possibly be reserved for shareholders.
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In the proposed improvements on existing bankruptcy law, Hart (1995) includes
a separation between the decisions of what to do with the firm, and who should get
what. In Harts proposal the debt claims are initially converted into equity, and then
follows the decision to either liquidate or reorganize the firm. The options to reorganize
or liquidate are then in the hands of the firms previous creditors that vote according
to the number of shares they have been awarded. This system replaces bargaining
among claimants who have different objectives with a vote by a homogeneous group of
equityholders.
2.1.5 Liquidation
Liquidation represents the termination of the firm and in comprehends the sale of its
assets. Following Myers and Majd (1990), the option to liquidate represents a simple
put option on the assets of the firm with a strike price equal to the liquidation value.
Basically the option to liquidate is exercised when the assets are worth more dead
than alive. There is an important distinction that can be made between the option to
liquidate and the option to abandon. In their analysis of competing technologies Myers
and Majd (1990) consider both options and the distinction between both represents
the liquidation value, whenever the liquidation value is zero, the option to liquidate is
simply an option to abandon a loss making business.
Following the natural sequence of events, the decision to liquidate is in the hands
of debtholders, either during the bankruptcy process (e.g. US Chapter 7) or following
the transfer of ownership that occurs during the bankruptcy process. White (1989)
argues that liquidation is the basic procedure of bankruptcy and this explains why in
most cases the US Chapter 7 proceedings are lunched by the creditors and not by the
firm.
Once again, we find in the literature an overlapping of costs for two different events,
bankruptcy and liquidation. Altman (1984) considers the costs of dismantling the as-
sets of the firm upon liquidation as a bankruptcy costs, however Haugen and Senbet
(1988) classify them more accurately as liquidation costs since they are not directly
related with bankruptcy. Liquidation may occur independently of bankruptcy. Fur-
thermore, Alderson and Betker (1995) argue that liquidation costs include as well the
fire sale of the assets and the administrative fees related to the decision of liquidation.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that when a firm is in financial distress it is likely
that the whole sector experiences similar problems. Since other firms in the same sec-
tor are the natural highest valuation buyers of the assets this will lead to assets sales
at prices below value in best use. However, in some cases, it is possible to avoid this
cost of liquidation. As Williamson (1988) discusses there are assets that have possible
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alternative uses, unspecialized assets, which may yield high liquidation values.
3 Theoretical representations of a financially dis-
tressed firm
3.1 Default triggers bankruptcy
Despite the fact that, as previously discussed, there are significant conceptual dif-
ferences between default and bankruptcy, the most common assumption in financial
modeling is to assume that default immediately triggers the bankruptcy process. In
simple words, default triggers a costly bankruptcy process that culminates in a transfer
of ownership from equityholders to debtholders. This approach presents several advan-
tages. It is simple to model, it allows for different outcomes of the bankruptcy process
(reorganization, liquidation or abandonment), it allows for the injection of funds in
the firm, default is endogenously determined and maximizes the value of the shares
respecting limited liability and absolute priority rules. This explains why different
branches of financial literature tend to make such modeling assumptions.
We find an extensive use of this assumption in the literature that analyses agency
conflicts between equityholders and debtholders regarding the following decisions: de-
cision to invest (Mauer and Sarkar, 2005), the decision to expand (Mauer and Ott,
2000, and Childs, Mauer and Ott, 2005) the option to change the risk of operations
(Leland, 1998 and Childs, Mauer and Ott, 2005) and the decision to shut down and
restart operations (Mello and Parsons, 1992). In the literature that analyses corporate
financing decisions it is also commonly assumed that bankruptcy immediately follows
default. We can find this assumption in the analysis of different debt characteristics in
terms of quality and protection in Leland (1994) and in the analysis of different debt
maturity structures in Leland and Toft (1996).
Although this assumption presents several advantages it still represents an over-
simplification that comes with its own problems. By ignoring financial distress and
its costs the event of default is unrealistically delayed in time. Furthermore, although
default is optimally triggered for equityholders, the costly bankruptcy process is not
optimally triggered for debtholders, which are exposed to bankruptcy costs. Relaxing
the first aspect would increase the risk for debtholders, but relaxing the second aspect
would reduce the present value of the bankruptcy costs. As so it is not clear how
this would impact the value of risky debt or the debt capacity of the firm, nor the
importance of any possible agency conflicts.
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3.2 Exogenously determined default and bankruptcy due to
financial constraints
One other common assumption in the financial literature is to assume that there are
exogenous determinants that trigger default and bankruptcy. In these cases there is
no option to default and the exogenous default triggers simply represent a barrier.
There are different justifications for the existence of these barriers. Default may sim-
ply be triggered whenever the cash-flows of the firm are insufficient to cover the interest
payments of the firm (cash-flow shortage). Ericsson (2000) examines the risk-shifting
problem under this assumption considering possible deviations from the absolute pri-
ority rule (APR) in default. Ericsson shows that deviations from APR encourage risk
taking, lower optimal leverage and reduce the maturity of debt. Titman, Tompaidis
and Tsyplakov (2004) also consider an exogenously determined default trigger in their
analysis of the option to increase the rate of investment under credit constraints. Tit-
man, Tompaidis and Tsyplakov (2004) analysis of credit constraints highlights one of
the main drawbacks of the cash-flow shortage approach, its limited generalization. In
order for default to occur due to cash-flow shortage, a number of events must occur
cumulatively. Equityholders must be cash constrained and unable to obtain personal
loans, no new equity can be issued and lenders are restricting credit. All these as-
sumptions are explicitly or implicitly needed to justify the suboptimal exogenously
determined default decision.
3.3 Exogenously determined default and bankruptcy due to
financial constraints
Debt covenants are usually written to reduce the risk to debtholders and/or to control
potential agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. Smith and Warner
(1979) define a debt covenant as a contractual provision, which restricts the firm from
engaging in specified actions once debt is issued. There are different types of pro-
tective covenants and different possible outcomes apart from default when a covenant
is breached. Next we describe the most common covenants analyzed following the
classification proposed in Smith and Warner (1979):
3.3.1 Production/Investment covenants:
These covenants restrict shareholders production/investments decisions in different
ways. (1) Protective covenants may specify the projects which the firm is allowed
to undertake (Smith and Warner, 1979), (2) they can impose minimum investment
requirements (Titman, Tompaidis, and Tsyplakov, 2004), (3) they may rule out the
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sale, lease, transfer, or disposal of any part of its properties and assets (Brennan and
Schwartz, 1984), (4) they may lock in specific assets until the bonds are paid in full
(Smith and Warner, 1979) (5) they may set a minimum asset coverage ratio in terms of
book (Brennan and Schwartz, 1984) or market value (Leland, 1994, Mauer and Triantis,
1994, Leland and Toft, 1996 and Bhanot and Mello, 2006). To breach these covenants
and effectively default may trigger different outcomes such as forcing the repayment
of outstanding debt, limiting new debt issues, increasing credit spreads, forcing equity
injections or even forcing the sale of some assets.
3.3.2 Dividend covenants:
Dividend payments reduce the investment, and the value of the firms bond, making
default more likely. Dividend covenants may impose a limit on distributions to equi-
tyholders by defining an inventory of funds available for dividend payments over the
life of debt (Smith and Warner, 1979), by imposing minimum investment requirements
therefore limiting the availability of funds for dividend payments (Titman, Tompaidis,
and Tsyplakov, 2004) or by imposing sinking fund deposits (Smith and Warner, 1979).
3.3.3 Financing covenants:
Financing covenants aim to limit the issuance of additional debt or to force the issuance
of equity. These covenants impose different restrictions such as (1) minimum asset
coverage (book or market value) limiting the borrowing capacity of the firm to a fixed
proportion of its asset size (Brennan and Schwartz, 1984, Bhanot and Mello, 2006)
or minimum interest coverage requirements (Brennan and Schwartz, 1984). To breach
these covenants and effectively default may trigger the repayment of outstanding debt,
the issuance of new equity or the sale of some assets.
3.3.4 Bonding covenants:
The most common type of bonding covenants are complex features such as puttable
or convertible options (Smith and Warner, 1979). These covenants allow debtholders
to exchange debt for either equity or for cash (debt repayment). Protective covenants
come in all sizes and shapes, as so, it not unusual to find that imposing an exogenous
default trigger not always creates value for debtholders, and especially when we con-
sider that some covenants restrict the sale of assets and the breaching of a different
covenant forces the sale of an asset. Production/Investment covenants can limit ef-
fectively agency asset substitution problems (Smith and Warner, 1979), however, in
some cases, these covenants and the dividend covenants can induce overinvestment in
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projects that do not generate value (Smith and Warner, 1979). The specific case of min-
imum asset coverage ratio covenants (secured debt) is more effective when liquidation
is more likely to take place than restructuring (Smith and Warner, 1979). Bahnot and
Mello (2006) show that protective covenants do not benefit high risk firms or firms with
asset values close to default. Also, those covenants that increase the credit spreads are
not efficient mechanisms of controlling the asset substitution problem and may in some
cases even stimulate it. Bonding covenants are shown to effectively mitigate agency
problems while avoiding bankruptcy. According to Barnea, Haugen and Senbet (1985)
the existence of bonding covenants is actually justified by the importance of agency
conflicts between equityholders and debtholders.
3.4 Separate default and bankruptcy or liquidation decisions
The traditional approach to assume that default triggers bankruptcy directly exposes
debtholders to potentially high bankruptcy costs. The decision to default optimizes the
value of equity but the decision to start the bankruptcy process is not optimized, it is
imposed on debtholders. A new approach has been modeled separating the decisions to
default from the decisions to start the bankruptcy process, to liquidate, or to reorganize
the firm. Following the optimal exercise of the option to default by equityholders,
an option is created and held by debtholders allowing them to start the bankruptcy
process, liquidate or reorganize the firm. Under this approach, both equityholders and
debtholders maximize their value sequentially, and the bankruptcy or liquidation costs
are minimized.
Harris and Raviv (1990) separate the decisions to default from the decision to
liquidate and also consider the role of managers in the process. Harris and Raviv argue
that debt plays a disciplining role because default gives creditors the option to force
the firm into liquidation and debtholders exercise their option to liquidate optimally.
Following default, managers following their self-interests (wanting to avoid liquidation
because it means the end of the road for them) must satisfy creditors in order to avoid
liquidation and they achieve this either through informal negotiations or through formal
bankruptcy proceedings. This alternative outcome of default influences the decision
of equityholders to default that must take into account the default costs and the fact
that upon default an optimal decision will be made by debtholders either to liquidate
or reorganize.
Bruche (2011) models a setting in which, following default, debtholders have the
right to demand full payment of their debt and hold an option to liquidate. Bruche
shows that optimal default and optimal liquidation occurs at different moments and
considering multiple debtholders there are conflicts between equityholders, who want
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to liquidate too late, and debtholders who want to liquidate too early. Bruch concludes
that these inefficiencies can to some extent be mitigated by adjustments to the capital
structure of the firm. Further work by Bruche and Naqvi (2010) has also considered
endogenous mechanism for liquidation, reflecting a setting close to creditor-friendly
bankruptcy regimes or secured debt. Once equityholders exercise their option to de-
fault, debt covenants are triggered awarding debtholders the option to liquidate the
firm. Debtholders are found not to liquidate the firm immediately upon default but are
willing to accept reduced coupon payments (i.e. partial default on coupon payments)
in hope that the firm may recover. If the firm deteriorates further debtholders will
eventually exercise their option to liquidate. Bruche and Naqvi (2010) show that the
default level affects the incentives to liquidate. The earlier default occurs, the lower is
the continuation value to debtholders, and hence the earlier they will want to liquidate.
Recursively, equityholders incorporate this outcome in their decision to default. This
separation of the option to liquidate from the option to default delays the exercise of
both options increases the value of debt and the optimal capital structure.
Broadie, Chernov and Sundaresan (2007) follow a similar approach but consider a
formal US bankruptcy process, defining a sequence of options regarding the decisions to
reorganize or liquidate and the transfer of the control rights between equityholders and
debtholders. They argue that equityholders have two options (option to liquidate and
option to reorganize), and the control rights are theirs to exercise one of these options.
However, if they exercise the option to reorganize under Chapter 11 (debt reorgani-
zation and/or suspension of contractual payments), the control rights are transferred
to debtholders. Debtholders now have two options, the same option to liquidate and
the option to keep the firm operating. Similarly to Bruche and Naqvi (2010), Broadie,
Chernov and Sundaresan (2007) also conclude that the separation between default and
bankruptcy also increases the optimal capital structure. The separation between the
decisions to default, liquidate or start the bankruptcy process highlights the sub opti-
mality of the traditional approach of assuming that bankruptcy follows default. Several
aspects are quite interesting when these options are separated such as the importance
of default and/or bankruptcy costs for an equityholder with limited liability and the
higher debt capacity of firms when debtholders are able to maximize their value fol-
lowing default. The assumption of separating default from bankruptcy or liquidation
highlights the importance of the interaction between the different options as analyzed
in Trigeorgis (1993). The impact of bankruptcy costs on the decision of equityholders
to default is explained by the interaction effects.
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3.5 Avoiding bankruptcy
As Hart (1995) discusses, bankruptcy law address the failure of different financial
agents in being able to draw up their own bankruptcy rules. A strand of the literature
addresses these aspects by explicitly modeling renegotiation between equityholders and
debtholders in order to avoid a costly bankruptcy procedure. Anderson and Sundaresan
(1996) show that the threat of bankruptcy costs may facilitate adjustments to the
financing of the firm. They study the design and the valuation of debt contracts
by incorporating bankruptcy costs in Merton (1974). They show that debtholders
may accept deviations from contractual payments because of the costliness of formal
bankruptcy. They employ the model to find the combination of contractual features
that maximize the debt capacity of the firm.
Hart and Moore (1998) consider the case that following default the creditor has the
option to liquidate the firms assets. Assuming symmetric information, but in which
there are variables that are not verifiable by debtholders, they show that renegotia-
tion following default will be comparatively straightforward. However, renegotiation
is shown not to achieve first best efficiency always. In some situations, the debtholder
could hold assets with a value exceeding the liquidation value, in which case there is no
way to compensate the debtor for not liquidating the assets (in the case that the default
decision is involuntary). Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) consider model strategic
debt service, by which equityholders force concessions from debtholders reducing the
interest payments relative to what was initially contracted therefore avoiding a costly
bankruptcy procedure.
A different approach aimed at avoiding bankruptcy is analyzed in Haugen and Sen-
bet (1988). This paper also considers a separation of the option to default and the
option to liquidate in a setting with bankruptcy and liquidation costs. Haugen and
Senbet show that bankruptcy costs are an insignificant determinant of a firms capital
structure and the decision to liquidate, and its associated costs, can be separated from
the event of bankruptcy. Moreover, any costs associated with the event of bankruptcy
are limited to the costs associated with an informal reorganization of the capital struc-
ture before default. The bankruptcy costs can be avoided if there is an adjustment to
the firms capital structure before default. One problem with capital adjustments of
the type proposed in Haugen and Senbet (1988) is that they rely on the availability of
financing by equityholders to retire debt and issue new debt and bear the additional
transaction costs associated.
This stream of the literature has important implications that go beyond financing
decisions and more recent research has shown that debt restructuring affects signifi-
cantly other corporate decisions such as investment and expansion. Important contri-
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butions are Sundaresan and Wang (2007), which analyses the impact of debt renegoti-
ations on initial investment decisions, and Pawlina (2010), which analyses the impact
of debt renegotiations on the decision to expand the production capacity of a firm.
4 Conclusions
The dynamics of a financially distressed firm are commonly oversimplified in finan-
cial models and there is an overlapping of the concepts of financial distress, default,
bankruptcy and liquidation.
The greatest simplification made in the literature is to assume exogenous default
triggers and the immediate start of the bankruptcy process following default. This case
is only theoretically realistic if one assumes the simultaneous existence of financial and
credit constraints. The main approach of modeling an endogenous determination of
default that triggers the immediate start of the bankruptcy process leaves debtholders
facing a sub-optimal bankruptcy decision. Several authors recognized the shortcomings
of this approach and separated both decisions yielding higher debt values and debt
capacity of firms.
The separation of the options to default from the option to start the bankruptcy
and/or liquidation procedures highlighted two very important aspects:
- The important interactions between both these options, even considering a simple
setting of limited liability and absolute priority rules;
- The impact that this separation of decisions, and the subsequent changes oper-
ated in terms of temporary or permanent concessions obtained from debtholders,
has on other corporate decisions such as investment and expansion.
Regardless of recent developments, this field of study still presents a wide range of
gaps and weaknesses that can be addressed allowing us to develop better representa-
tions of the events and stages a financially troubled firm experiences such as:
(1) Following Brealey at al. (2006), one improvement of existing models could
be to explicitly model the costs of financial distress, in which the dynamics of firm
value change for a distress firm. In this model distress generates significant costs,
accelerates default and possibly bankruptcy, increase the price of credit and reduce the
debt capacity of firms.
(2) Following Williamson (1988), greater importance can be given to the decision to
liquidate the assets of the firm. Considering alternative uses and possibly no correlation
between the continuation value and the liquidation value, it would be interesting to
analyze how this affects the capital structure of a firm and the role of some debt
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covenants such as early liquidation penalties. One easy approach for this scenario
would be to use the model developed in McDonald and Siegel (1986) in which there are
uncertain returns and uncertain liquidation values (this approach is actually suggested
in the original article).
(3) Develop an improved structural model of risky debt by considering the whole
sequence of events described in Figure 1, in which there are multiple options that are
sequentially exercised by different agents. The interaction between all these different
options makes it hard to predict the impact in terms of the debt capacity of a firm.
However, Liquidation is often considered a last resource option when in reality it is
an option that should be considered even before financial distress. It is not always
the case that that the liquidation value of the assets is positively correlated with the
operating value of the firm. McDonald and Siegel (1986) analyze in their model for
default, the case in which liquidation value is uncorrelated and/or probably negatively
correlated with the operating value of the firm. It would be interesting to analyze the
impact of protective covenants considering this case.
These are all aspects that future research may want to address and the ongoing
sovereign debt crisis insures this area of research will remain of interest in the near
future.
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Figures
Figure 1: Sequence of events a financially troubled firm may experience
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